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FLEEING EAST FROM INDIAN COUNTRY: STATE V.
ERIKSEN AND TRIBAL INHERENT SOVEREIGN
AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL
FRESH PURSUIT
Kevin Naud, Jr.
Abstract: In State v. Eriksen, the Washington State Supreme Court held that Indian tribes
do not possess the inherent sovereign authority to continue cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit
and detain a non-Indian who violated the law on reservation land. This Comment argues the
Eriksen Court’s reliance on RCW 10.92.020 is misplaced. RCW 10.92.020 is irrelevant to a
consideration of sovereign authority. States do not have the authority to unilaterally define
tribal power. A tribe retains sovereign powers not taken by Congress, given away in a treaty,
or removed by implication of its dependent status. The Eriksen Court also misinterpreted the
state statute as a limit on tribal authority to enforce laws and incorrectly dismissed the
validity of cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of a non-felon. Eriksen guts the ability of tribes
to enforce their sovereign right to uphold the law and safety on the reservation. To reinforce
tribal power, Congress should enact legislation similar to the “Duro Fix,” a statutory
recognition of inherent sovereign authority.

INTRODUCTION
On September 1, 2011, the Washington State Supreme Court decided
State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III).1 Writing for the majority, Justice Fairhurst
held that a tribal police officer lacked the inherent sovereign authority2
to stop and detain a non-Indian defendant outside the tribe’s territorial

1. 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011).
2. Inherent sovereign authority is defined as “those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by
treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.” United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citation omitted), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2)
(2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.02[1], at 222–23 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., 2012) [hereinafter
COHEN]. Cohen’s Handbook provides the legal basis for inherent authority: (1) consistent with
Supreme Court precedent, prior to European contact, a tribe possessed the powers of any sovereign
state; (2) consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the tribe’s presence within the United States
“subjects the tribe to federal legislative power and precludes the exercise of external powers of
sovereignty of the tribe . . . but does not by itself affect the internal sovereignty of the tribe;” and, as
a result, (3) tribes retain internal sovereignty for all powers not diminished by treaties or by express
legislation of Congress. Id. Since Cohen first published his handbook in 1941, the Supreme Court
added the third way a sovereign power is removed from a tribe: as a necessary implication of its
dependent status. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. Inherent powers are not delegated to tribes by
Congress, but are powers that have never been extinguished. COHEN, supra, § 4.01[1][a], at 207.
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jurisdiction, even though pursuit began within the reservation.3 Eriksen
III mandates that tribal officers who are not certified to enforce
Washington law under RCW 10.92.020 release non-Indian law violators
who have fled the reservation with officers in fresh pursuit.4 In effect,
Eriksen III permits non-Indians to act with impunity on tribal land as
long as they can successfully evade tribal officers.5
The Eriksen III holding will harm tribal interests. Tribes allow a large
number of non-Indian visitors to enter their reservations on a daily basis
to further economic development. Twenty-two of Washington’s twentynine federally-recognized tribes operate casinos.6 There are also other
retail establishments located within reservations that draw visitors. The
level of non-Indian traffic is extraordinary. The Tulalip reservation alone
receives 42,000 guests on a weekday and over 60,000 on a weekend
day.7 In the face of this level of ingress, tribes without state approval to
enforce state law are now limited in their ability to ensure health and
safety on the reservation.
This unpalatable result should not stand because Eriksen III flies in
the face of established law. Part I of this Comment provides an overview
of the federal government’s “plenary and exclusive” authority to define

3. 172 Wash. 2d at 515, 259 P.3d at 1084.
4. Id. at 514–15, 259 P.3d at 1083–84.
5. Id. at 520–21, 259 P.3d at 1086 (Owens, J., dissenting).
6. GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON STATE TRIBAL DIRECTORY 1–3 (Nov.
2011), available at http://www.goia.wa.gov/Tribal-Directory/TribalDirectory.pdf; WASH. STATE
GAMBLING COMM’N TRIBAL & TECHNICAL GAMBLING DIV., TRIBAL CASINOS IN WASHINGTON
STATE (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.wsgc.wa.gov/docs/tribal/tribal_casinos.pdf. There are
twenty-eight tribal casinos. Tribe (Name of Casino(s)): Colville (Coulee Dam Casino; Mill Bay
Casino; Okanogan Bingo-Casino); Chehalis (Lucky Eagle Casino); Jamestown S’Klallam (7 Cedars
Casino); Kalispel (Northern Quest Casino); Lummi Nation (Silver Reef Casino); Muckleshoot
(Muckleshoot Casino; Muckleshoot Casino II); Nisqually (Red Wind Casino); Nooksack (Nooksack
River Casino); Port Gamble (The Point Casino); Puyallup (Emerald Queen Casino at I-5; Emerald
Queen Casino at Fife); Quinault (Quinault Beach Resort); Skokomish (Lucky Dog Casino);
Shoalwater Bay (Shoalwater Bay Casino); Snoqualmie (Casino Snoqualmie); Spokane (Chewelah
Casino; Two Rivers Casino); Squaxin Island (Little Creek Casino); Stilliguamish (Angel of the
Winds Casino); Suquamish (Clearwater Casino); Swinomish (Northern Lights Casino); Tulalip
(Tulalip Resort Casino; Quil Ceda Creek Casino); Upper Skagit (Skagit Valley Casino Resort); and
Yakama Nation (Legends Casino). Id.
7. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, 38th Legislative District, in Olympia, Wash. (Feb. 14, 2012)
(on file with University of Washington Law Review). However, not all reservations receive that
volume of visitation. For example, the Cowlitz Indian Tribe estimates it will see between 16,000
and 19,000 vehicle trips each day to its proposed casino near La Center, WA. Thacher Schmid, In
$1 Million Document, Cowlitz Tribe Defends Casino’s Potential Environmental Impact, THE DAILY
NEWS (Longview, Wash.) (June 29, 2008), http://tdn.com/business/local/in-million-documentcowlitz-tribe-defends-casino-s-potential-environmental/article_ce80ab50-6681-5cd2-af0748cc00323d86.html.
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inherent sovereign authority. Part II outlines the legal analysis the
Washington State Supreme Court used in recognizing tribal power to
stop and detain non-Indians who violate the law on the reservation in
State v. Schmuck.8 Part III demonstrates that Washington statutes have
removed jurisdictional barriers from officers pursuing law violators. The
final background section, Part IV, lays out Eriksen III’s procedural
history and legal arguments. This Comment argues in Part V that the
Eriksen III decision is a misunderstanding of the analysis for inherent
sovereign authority, a misapplication of the canons of construction for
tribal treaties and statutes, a misinterpretation of the statute authorizing
certification of tribal officers to enforce state law, a misappropriation of
precedents and statutes regarding barriers to fresh pursuit, and a
misalignment with public policy. To limit the precedential effect of
Eriksen III, this Comment suggests in Part VI that Congress should use
its exclusive power to define inherent sovereign authority and statutorily
recognize the right of tribal officers to protect safety on their reservation
through cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of non-Indians who break the
law on tribal land.

I.

CONGRESS HAS “EXCLUSIVE AND PLENARY
AUTHORITY” TO DEFINE A TRIBE’S INHERENT
SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY AND DELEGATE JURISDICTION
OVER TRIBAL RESERVATIONS

Congress has the sole discretion to define tribal authority and to
delegate jurisdiction within Indian Country.9 Congress’s supremacy in
8. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993).
9. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) (“Congress, with this Court’s approval,
has interpreted the Constitution’s ‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing it to enact legislation that
both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restriction on tribal sovereign authority.”); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (“The whole intercourse between the United State and
[the Cherokee] nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United
States.”), abrogation recognized in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); State v. Comenout, 173
Wash. 2d. 235, 238, 267 P.3d 355, 357 (2011) (“‘[S]tates . . . lack . . . criminal jurisdiction over
Indians within Indian country, absent federal legislation specifying to the contrary.’ Significantly,
Congress enacted a law[,] . . . Public Law 280, which authorized Washington among a few other
states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country by statute without the consent of the tribe.”)
(quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 604[1], at 537 (Nell Jessup Newton et
al., eds., 2005)). See generally Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903) (declaring that
Congress has the “plenary” right to abrogate Indian Treaties), abrogated by Delaware Tribal
Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); and United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384
(1905) (stating that the equal footing doctrine does not supersede the federal government’s
recognition of a tribe’s right to fish at usual and accustomed locations).
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Indian affairs is founded in the Indian Commerce Clause10 and the
Treaty Clause11 of the Constitution.12 On this basis, the United States
Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that Congress’s power is “plenary
and exclusive” in Indian matters.13 The Court has also stated that
Congress’s termination of the practice of entering treaties with tribes14
does not diminish its legislative authority.15 This conclusion rests in part
upon the historical view that Indian relations are not domestic issues, but
fall under the military and foreign policy powers “necessarily inherent in
any Federal Government.”16 Therefore, defining a tribe’s inherent
sovereign authority is a federal question, not a state issue.17 In United
States v. Wheeler,18 the Court reiterated that a state’s interests are not a
factor in determining the extent of tribal inherent sovereign authority:
The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and
limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts,
the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn
by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status.19
In this vein, the Court once held that “the laws of [a State] can have
no force” within a reservation.20 While this bar on state power is no

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
13. Id. (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian
tribes, powers that we have consistently described as ‘plenary and exclusive.’”) (citations omitted);
see also Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993) (“Congress has plenary authority to alter
these jurisdictional guideposts . . . .”) (citation omitted).
14. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006) (“No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States
shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the
United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with
any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.”).
15. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 203 (1975)).
16. Id.
17. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (stating that “state
authority over non-Indians acting on tribal reservations is pre-empted even though Congress has
offered no explicit statement on the subject”); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
18. 435 U.S. 313 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in
Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
19. Id. at 323 (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832), abrogation recognized in Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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longer binding, a state’s interests still cannot dominate a tribe’s interest
in maintaining sovereignty over its members and its territory, or usurp
the power of Congress to define tribal authority.21
As part of its purview, Congress can delegate its authority to regulate
a tribe.22 For instance, Congress has ceded control over criminal and
civil jurisdiction in Indian Country to a few states.23 In 1953, Congress
mandated that six states assume jurisdiction over Indian Country24 under
Public Law 280.25 Congress also authorized any other state to assume
the same jurisdiction.26 With the law, Congress hoped to both combat
perceived lawlessness on reservations and diminish tribal dependence on
federal resources.27 Initially, Public Law 280 did not require states to
seek permission from tribes before assuming jurisdiction.28 Congress
amended Public Law 280 in 1968 so that any subsequent assertion of
jurisdiction over Indian Country required assent from the relevant tribes,
but Congress did not require states to retroactively seek permission from
tribes already under state authority.29 However, Congress did expressly
authorize retrocession of jurisdiction back to the federal government.30
In total, state jurisdiction over Indian affairs within Indian Country
requires Congress’s permission.31
21. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 141–42, 151.
22. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (The Court rejected an
unconstitutional delegation of powers argument because “[i]t is necessary only to state that the
independent tribal authority is quite sufficient to protect Congress’s decision to vest in tribal
councils this portion of its own authority ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian tribes’”)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2006).
24. Indian Country is defined as “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . all
dependent Indian communities . . . [and] all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished.” Id. § 1151.
25. Id. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). The six states were California, Wisconsin, Alaska,
Minnesota, Oregon, and Nebraska. Id.
26. 25 U.S.C. § 1321 (2006).
27. See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1418 (1997) (arguing that Public Law 280,
although intended to address perceived lawlessness on reservations, actually compounded the
problem by creating jurisdictional gaps in which no authority either could, or was willing to, enforce
the law).
28. Id. at 1406–07.
29. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321–1323.
30. Id.
31. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 365 (2001) (“The States’ inherent jurisdiction on reservations
can of course be stripped by Congress . . . .”) (citing Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 242–43
(1896)); Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470–71
(1979) (“As a practical matter, this has meant that criminal offenses by or against Indians have been
subject only to federal or tribal laws, except where Congress in the exercise of its plenary and
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Prior to the amendment, in 1963, Washington assumed jurisdiction
over Indian Country within the state.32 Washington still holds this
jurisdictional power but affords tribes the option to request
retrocession.33
II.

THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS FOUND
THAT NEITHER CONGRESS NOR THE TREATY OF POINT
ELLIOTT HAS EXPRESSLY DIVESTED TRIBES OF THE
POWER TO DETAIN NON-INDIANS

As stated in Wheeler, tribes retain “those aspects of sovereignty not
withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of
their dependent status.”34 In 1993, the Washington State Supreme Court
decided State v. Schmuck.35 In that case, the question before the Court
was whether a tribal officer36 had the inherent authority to stop and
detain a non-Indian driving on a public road.37 To answer this question,
the Court undertook the analysis the U.S. Supreme Court mandated in

exclusive power over Indian affairs has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.”) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Comenout, 173 Wash. 2d 235, 238, 267 P.3d
355, 357 (2011) (“[S]tates . . . lack . . . criminal jurisdiction over Indians within Indian country,
absent federal legislation specifying to the contrary. Significantly, Congress enacted a
law[,] . . . Public Law 280, which authorized Washington among a few other states to assume
jurisdiction over Indian country by statute without the consent of the tribe.”) (quoting COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 604[1], at 537 (Nell Jessup Newton et al., eds., 2005)).
States have jurisdiction over non-Indian/non-Indian crime throughout the territorial bounds of the
state. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010) (“The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds
itself to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations,
country, and lands within this state in accordance with the consent of the United State given by
[Public Law 280], but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to Indians when on their tribal
lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and held in trust by the United States
or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States . . . except for the
following: (1) Compulsory school attendance; (2) Public assistance; (3) Domestic relations; (4)
Mental illness; (5) Juvenile delinquency; (6) Adoption proceedings; (7) Dependent children; and (8)
Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, roads and highways . . . .”).
33. ESHB 2233, ch. 48 § 1, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified as WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)). Among other steps, the statute requires the governor to approve the
retrocession. Id.
34. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citation omitted), superseded by statute,
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see supra
note 2.
35. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993).
36. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of Washington’s recognition of tribal officers in WASH.
REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010).
37. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 379, 850 P.2d at 1335.
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Wheeler.38
A.

The Federal Government Permits Tribes to Exercise Jurisdiction
over Non-Members and Non-Indians Under Certain Circumstances

In theory, the colonial process and westward expansion deprived
tribes of their external sovereignty but left internal sovereignty intact.39
Their internal authority is an aspect of sovereignty that has never been
extinguished.40 For instance, tribes have the inherent right to govern
themselves and their territory.41 However, due to the diminishment of
their external sovereignty, tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians and only possess civil jurisdiction where there is a sufficient
nexus between the action and the tribe’s internal interests.42
Notwithstanding the power to create and enforce an internal code,43
tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.44 The U.S.
Supreme Court expounded on this principle in three cases: Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,45 Wheeler,46 and Duro v. Reina.47 In Oliphant,
the Court concluded there was no evidence indicating federal
recognition of tribal jurisdiction over non-members in either judicial

38. Id. at 380, 850 P.2d at 1335–36; see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
39. See COHEN supra note 2, § 4.02[1], at 222–23.
40. See id., §4.01[1][a], at 207.
41. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (“[T]o allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here
would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial that respondent is not an
Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in
this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations.”)
(citations omitted).
42. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 677 (1990) (holding that the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community could not prosecute a non-member Indian who shot and killed a member on the Salt
River Indian Reservation), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981)
(stating that a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority does not sustain its attempts to regulate nonIndian hunting and fishing on non-Indian lands within the reservation).
43. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323–24 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006).
45. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (holding that tribes do not have the sovereign authority to prosecute
non-Indians), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S.
193.
46. 435 U.S. 313 (holding that because the ability of a tribe to prosecute tribal members was
inherent, and not a delegated power, subsequent federal prosecution was not double jeopardy).
47. 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in
Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
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precedents or legislative history.48 As the Court made explicit in
Wheeler, a tribe’s diminished status meant it retained only jurisdiction
over tribal members, unless Congress expressly redefined the limits of
tribal jurisdiction.49 The Court again affirmed that tribes lack criminal
jurisdiction over non-members in Duro.50 Congress superseded Duro by
amending the Indian Civil Rights Act51 to grant tribes criminal
jurisdiction over all Indians (known as the “Duro Fix”).52 However, the
amendment failed to grant criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.53
While tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, they
do have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in rare instances known as
the Montana exceptions.54 In Montana v. United States,55 the United
States filed suit to quiet title over a riverbed within the Crow Indian
Reservation and to establish both the Crow Tribe of Montana and the
federal government as the only authorities over game within the
reservation.56 The Crow Tribe sought to prevent non-members from
fishing and hunting within the reservation based on both the tribe’s
inherent sovereign authority to regulate actions on tribal land and the
provisions of the treaties that created the reservation.57 However,
Montana refused to acquiesce to the tribe’s desire to regulate nonmember behavior because title over the riverbed in question was
disputed and numerous non-members owned land within the
reservation.58 The Supreme Court held that the tribe’s inherent
sovereignty did not authorize it to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on land within the reservation held in fee by non-Indians.59 The
48. 435 U.S. at 203–11.
49. 435 U.S. at 322–23.
50. 495 U.S. at 677. However, both Oliphant and Duro indicate tribes may and should detain law
violators and transfer them to the proper authorities. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208; Duro, 495 U.S. at
696–97.
51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006).
52. Id. § 1301(2) (“‘[P]owers of self-government’ means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe . . . and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized
and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”).
53. Id. §§ 1301–1303.
54. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
55. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
56. Id. at 544.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. “[I]n addition to the power to punish tribal offenders, the Indian tribes retain their inherent
power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to
prescribe rules of inheritance for members. But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
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Court recognized two exceptions to this general denial of tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians.60 The tribe can: (1) regulate the activities
of non-members who “enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements,” and (2) “retain inherent power to exercise civil authority
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”61
After Montana, courts have cautioned against applying the exceptions
too broadly.62 For example, the Ninth Circuit, in County of Lewis v.
Allen,63 stated that a broad application of the second exception would
lead to absolute jurisdiction by tribes.64 In the court’s opinion, any
activity on a reservation is conceivably linked to the vitality of a tribe’s
political, economic, health, or welfare interests.65 Echoing this concern,
the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the “second exception . . . is only
triggered by nonmember conduct that threatens the Indian tribe; it does
not broadly permit the exercise of civil authority wherever it might be
considered ‘necessary’ to self-government.”66
The Supreme Court narrowed the application of the exceptions in
Strate v. A-1 Contractors67 and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation.68 The Court stressed that a balance must
be upheld between protecting tribal self-government and unduly

status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.” Id. at 564
(citations omitted).
60. Id. at 565–66.
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 657 n.12 (2001); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (stating that the Montana exceptions did not apply because
both parties in the civil suit were non-members and opening tribal courts for use by the plaintiff in
this case is not required to protect tribal self-government); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989) (holding that the exceptions did not
apply to instances of zoning fee lands owned by non-members in “open” areas, but did in areas
closed to the general public. Opening the land to the public diminished the interest of the tribe);
Cnty. of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a tribal requirement that
county law enforcement officers be subjected to tribal court jurisdiction was not a sufficient
component of tribal self-government to allow the interference of a state’s decision to require
adjudication in state courts).
63. 163 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 1998).
64. Id. at 515.
65. Id.
66. Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 657 n.12 (citation omitted).
67. 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997); see supra note 62.
68. 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989); see supra note 62.
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interfering with a state’s interests.69 Specifically, the second exception
only applies when tribal jurisdiction is required to ensure the tribe’s right
to govern itself.70 A lower court interpreted the Supreme Court as having
indicated that a threat to tribal interest need not necessarily come from
within the reservation.71 However, the Court has stated that the threat
must constitute an attack on the continued viability of the tribe’s
sovereignty.72
Following this mandate, the Ninth Circuit found that the right to make
laws and enforce them is an essential element of sovereignty.73 In Settler
v. Lameer,74 the court held that the Yakima Indian Nation had the right
to enforce fishing regulations through arrest and seizure at its treatypreserved fishing sites located off-reservation.75 The court decided it is
difficult to enforce regulations without the ability to arrest: “the power to
regulate is only meaningful when combined with the power to
enforce.”76 The Ninth Circuit continued this line of reasoning in OrtizBarraza v. United States.77 The Ortiz-Barraza court acknowledged that a
tribe has the power to create laws and the right to exclude violators who
have been trespassed.78 Lacking the power to prosecute, tribes can only
enforce their right by delivering violators to state law enforcement.79
The Washington State Supreme Court applied this federally-created
standard in State v. Schmuck.80 Similar to both Settler and Ortiz-Barraza,
69. Strate, 520 U.S. at 457–58; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 431.
70. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
71. John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska 1999) (“Thus, in determining whether tribes retain
their sovereign powers, the United States Supreme Court looks to the character of the power that the
tribe seeks to exercise, not merely the location of events.”).
72. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 341 (2008) (citing
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain
Tobacco Co., 569 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645, 657 n.12 (2001)).
73. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1974).
74. 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
75. Id. at 239.
76. Id. at 238.
77. 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975).
78. Id. at 1179; see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696–97 (1990) (“The tribes also possess
their traditional and undisputed power to exclude persons whom they deem to be undesirable from
tribal lands. . . . [A]nd if necessary, to eject them.”) (citations omitted), superseded by statute, 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that tribes retain the inherent authority to “prescribe
laws for their members and to punish infractions of those laws”), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
79. Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F.2d at 1179.
80. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 381–83, 850 P.2d 1332, 1336–37 (1993).
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the Court stated that a fundamental aspect of creating a legal code is the
ability to stop violators.81 In particular, a tribal officer’s inability to pull
drivers over would render a tribal traffic code “virtually meaningless,”
allowing non-Indians to act with impunity upon a reservation.82 The
Court followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance in Oliphant and
Duro, stating that detention by tribal officers is “a tribe’s proper
response to crime committed by a non-Indian on the reservation.”83 The
Schmuck Court also indicated that no court has ever held that a state’s
assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 precludes the
concurrent authority of tribes to stop law violators.84 Furthermore, under
a Montana analysis, the ability to detain drivers—in particular, drunk
drivers—significantly affects the health and welfare of the tribe.85
Neither the removal of a tribe’s external authority nor an express
provision of Congress prevented a tribe from exercising its sovereign
right to enforce law through traffic stops.86
B.

The Treaty of Point Elliott Mandates that the Party Tribes Transfer
Violators to State Authorities

Another method to define inherent sovereign authority is to look at
the provisions of the relevant tribal treaty.87 As the Wheeler Court
mandated, courts must look to express language in federal statutes and
treaties.88 A treaty is viewed as a grant of rights from the tribe to the
United States, and aboriginal powers are reserved unless expressly
relinquished in the treaty.89
However, when a Washington court analyzes an issue of Indian law,
it is guided by two different standards.90 On one hand, because
81. Id. A tribe’s grant of a highway easement to a state does not extinguish the tribe’s interests in
the land. See State v. Pink, 144 Wash. App. 945, 947, 185 P.3d 634, 635 (2008) (declaring that the
state did not have jurisdiction to prosecute a violator for unlawfully possessing a firearm on a road
running through tribal land because the violation was not a traffic violation).
82. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 381–83, 850 P.2d at 1336–37.
83. Id. at 386–87, 850 P.2d at 1339 (citations omitted); see supra note 50.
84. 121 Wash. 2d at 395–96, 850 P.2d at 1344 (quoting Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672 (8th
Cir. 1990)).
85. Id. at 391, 850 P.2d at 1341.
86. Id. at 381–83, 386–91, 850 P.2d at 1336–37, 1338–42.
87. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
88. See id.
89. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 384, 850 P.2d at 1338.
90. Compare Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) (“[S]tatutes are to
be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
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Washington assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280, Washington
can pass statutes affecting its own criminal and civil jurisdiction on the
reservation.91 When interpreting a state statute, a Washington court must
give effect to the intent of the state legislature demonstrated through the
plain and ordinary meaning of the language unless related statutes reveal
contrary legislative intent.92 On the other hand, when a court attempts to
interpret an Indian treaty or a federal statute governing tribal affairs, it
must construe the language as the Indians would naturally have
understood the words, with any ambiguities resolved liberally in favor of
the tribes.93 These canons of interpretation compensate for the presumed
inferior bargaining power and knowledge of the Indians at the time of
negotiation, and reinforce the special duty the United States government
owes to tribes.94
In Schmuck, the Washington State Supreme Court quashed this
interpretive dilemma when evaluating the power of a tribal officer to
detain non-Indian law violators.95 The Court determined that
Washington’s assumption of jurisdiction under Public Law 280 cannot
undermine the provisions of the Treaty of Point Elliott (Point Elliott).96

benefit . . . .”) (citations omitted), with Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d
1, 11, 43 P.3d 4, 10 (2002) (“[T]he plain meaning is still derived from what the Legislature has said
in its enactments, but that meaning is discerned from all that the Legislature has said in the statute
and related statutes which disclose legislative intent . . . . [I]f, after this inquiry, the statute remains
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, the statute is ambiguous and it is appropriate to
resort to aids to construction, including legislative history.”) (citations omitted).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010).
92. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d at 11, 43 P.3d at 10; Burns v. City of Seattle, 161
Wash. 2d 129, 140, 164 P.3d 475, 481 (2007) (“Plain meaning is discerned from viewing the words
of a particular provision in the context of the statute in which they are found, together with related
statutory provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.”) (citing Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146
Wash. 2d at 11, 43 P.3d at 10).
93. State v. Buchanan, 138 Wash. 2d 186, 202, 978 P.2d 1070, 1078 (1999); Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. at 766.
94. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 385, 850 P.2d at 1338; see also Seminole Nation v. United States,
316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942).
95. 121 Wash. 2d at 393–96, 850 P.2d at 1342–44.
96. Id. Many tribal reservations in Northwest Washington were created as a result of the 1855
Treaty of Point Elliott. Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 [hereinafter Point Elliott];
see also Krista J. Kapralos & Eric Stevick, Treaty’s Key Points of Contention—Document That
Established Indian Reservations Still Debated, EVERETT HERALD (Oct. 22, 2006, 12:01 a.m.),
available at http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20061022/NEWS01/610220766/0/rss01 [hereinafter
Kapralos and Stevick].
In the treaty, northwest tribes, including the Duwamish, Suquamish, Snoqualmie, Snohomish,
Lummi, Skagit, and Swinomish, ceded their land to the U.S. government. The treaty was part of a
large-scale effort on the part of the U.S. government to concentrate Indians on reservations where
they could be acculturated into civilized society. Under the guidance of an agent, the Indians
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In regard to cross-jurisdictional authority, Article IX of the treaty states,
“[a]nd the said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against the
laws of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities for
trial.”97 The Court stated that, under the Indian canons of interpretation,
Article IX requires the detention and transfer of non-members to state
authorities.98 A state cannot diminish rights reserved in a treaty,99 and
Congress did not expressly divest tribes of the right to detain and
transfer in Public Law 280.100 Nothing in Public Law 280 precludes
concurrent jurisdiction between states and tribes.101 Such an
interpretation is in line with Congress’s stated goal: to improve law
enforcement on reservations.102 A court cannot read state statutes to
exceed statutory grants of power and undermine related federal
policies.103 Therefore, tribes have the right to stop and detain nonIndians who violate the law within a reservation.104

received allotments of land, upon which they were to farm, as opposed to hunt and gather. The
Indians were also expected to attend church and school. As one annual report of the Commissioner
on Indian Affairs described, the U.S. supplied the tribes “with agricultural implements, mechanical
tools, domestic animals, instructors in the useful arts, teachers, physicians, and Christian
missionaries . . . .” ROBERT ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY
80–84 (2d ed. 2010) (reproducing a series of annual reports from the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs describing the effort to civilize Indian tribes).
Point Elliott created what is today called the Tulalip Reservation, and a few other temporary
reservations. Point Elliott, supra, art. II–III; Kapralos and Stevick, supra. However, the temporary
reservations have morphed into permanent reservations like the Lummi Reservation. Lummi
Reservation,
THE
BELLINGHAM
HERALD,
Sep.
11,
2007,
available
at
http://www.bellinghamherald.com/2007/09/11/178500/lummi-reservation.html.
97. Point Elliott, supra note 96, art. IX. (“The said tribes and bands acknowledge their
dependence on the Government of the United States, and promise to be friendly with all citizens
thereof, and they pledge themselves to commit no depredations on the property of such citizens.
Should any one or more of them violate this pledge, and the fact be satisfactorily proven before the
agent, the property taken shall be returned, or in default thereof, or if injured or destroyed,
compensation may be made by the government out of their annuities. Nor will they make war on
any other tribe except in self-defense, but will submit all matters of difference between them and the
other Indians to the government of the United States or its agent for decision, and abide thereby.
And if any of the said Indians commit depredations on other Indians within the Territory the same
rule shall prevail as that prescribed in this article in cases of depredations against citizens. And the
said tribes agree not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws of the United States, but to
deliver them up to the authorities for trial.”).
98. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 384–85, 850 P.2d at 1338.
99. Id. at 393, 396, 850 P.2d at 1343–44.
100. Id. at 396, 850 P.2d at 1344.
101. Id. at 395, 850 P.2d at 1343 (quoting Walker v. Rushing, 898 F.2d 672 (8th Cir. 1990)).
102. Id. at 394–96, 850 P.2d at 1343–44.
103. Id. at 395–96, 850 P.2d at 1344.
104. Id. at 396, 850 P.2d at 1343.
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III. WASHINGTON STATUTES AUTHORIZE OFFICERS TO
ENGAGE IN CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL FRESH PURSUIT
The Court held in Schmuck that a tribal officer may detain nonIndians for law violations that occur within the boundaries of the
reservation.105 However, Schmuck did not involve cross-jurisdictional
pursuit.106 To evaluate the authority of a tribal officer to detain nonIndians outside of the reservation, one must consider the effects of the
Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act,107 the Uniform Act
on Fresh Pursuit,108 and RCW 10.92.020.
A.

The Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers Act Removed
the Requirement That the Underlying Crime Be a Felony for Fresh
Pursuit

The purpose of the Washington Mutual Aid Peace Officers Powers
Act (Powers Act) is to remove the “artificial barriers to mutual aid and
cooperative enforcement of the laws among general authority local,
state, and federal agencies.”109 Once certified as a general authority
peace officer,110 an officer can enforce Washington traffic and criminal
laws throughout the state so long as that officer has the consent of the
jurisdiction in which the exercise of authority occurs, is transporting a
prisoner, responding to an emergency, or executing a warrant.111
Another instance in which officers can arrest outside their jurisdiction

105. Id.
106. Id. at 377–78, 850 P.2d at 1333–34.
107. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010).
108. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.89.010–.080 (2010).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.001(2).
110. The Powers Act distinguishes between a “general authority Washington law enforcement
agency,” whose primary function is the detection of law violations (State Patrol, Department of Fish
and Wildlife), and a “limited authority Washington law enforcement agency” that enforces laws as
only one of its functions (the State Gambling Commission or Parks and Recreation Commission). A
“general authority Washington peace officer” is any full-time, fully compensated employee of a
general authority law enforcement agency, but a “limited authority Washington peace officer” can
serve as a general authority peace officer if qualified under other sections of the act. WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.93.020.
111. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070 specifies that a general
authority peace officer can enforce the laws of the state “throughout the territorial bounds of this
state” in the following instances: (1) with written consent of the sheriff or chief of police in whose
jurisdiction the “exercise of powers” occurs; (2) when responding to an emergency involving
immediate threat to human life or property; (3) if requested to aid pursuant to a mutual assistance
agreement by the agency or officer with enforcement authority; (4) when transporting a prisoner; (5)
when executing a warrant; or (6) when in fresh pursuit as defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120.
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is in fresh pursuit.112 Prior to the Powers Act, an officer could only
engage in cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit when pursuing a suspected
felon.113 The Powers Act broadened the instances in which an officer can
engage in this type of pursuit:
Any peace officer who has authority under Washington law to
make an arrest may proceed in fresh pursuit of a person (a) who
is reasonably believed to have committed a violation of traffic or
criminal laws, or (b) for whom such officer holds a warrant of
arrest, and such peace officer shall have the authority to arrest
and to hold such person in custody anywhere in the state.114
Thus, a peace officer can pursue an individual who violates a traffic law
throughout the State of Washington.115
B.

An Officer Does Not Need to Be Certified to Enforce Washington
Law to Engage in Cross-Jurisdictional Fresh Pursuit

In 1943, Washington adopted the Uniform Act on Fresh Pursuit
(Uniform Act).116 The Uniform Act authorizes any peace officer of
another state to continue fresh pursuit into Washington and make a valid
arrest for violations of that state’s laws.117 The officer must only take the
arrested individual before a Washington magistrate to evaluate the
lawfulness of the arrest and initiate extradition.118 The original 1943
statute only authorized cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of suspected
felons, but, in 1998, the legislature expanded the grant of authority to
cover “driving while intoxicated, driving under the influence of drugs or
alcohol, driving while impaired, [and] reckless driving[.]”119
The 1998 amendment to the Uniform Act clarified the crossjurisdictional rights of foreign officers in matters of drunk driving.120 For
112. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070(6). “Fresh pursuit” is not necessarily immediate pursuit, but
is pursuit without unreasonable delay. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120. It can also be defined by the
common law. Id.
113. City of Wenatchee v. Durham, 43 Wash. App. 547, 550, 718 P.2d 819, 821–22 (1986),
superseded by statute, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900, as recognized in Vance v. State, 116
Wash. App. 412, 65 P.3d 668 (2003).
114. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1).
115. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120.
116. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.89.010–.080 (2010); 1943 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 261, § 1.
117. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.010.
118. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.020.
119. Compare 1943 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 261, § 1, with 1998 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 1.
120. Compare In re Richie, 127 Wash. App. 935, 113 P.3d 1045 (2005), and State v. Steinbrunn,
54 Wash. App. 506, 510–12, 774 P.2d 55, 58–59 (1989) (holding that a Washington peace officer
could arrest an unconscious defendant in an Oregon hospital pursuant to the Uniform Act), with
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instance, take the conflicting results of In re Richie121 and State v.
Barker.122 In Richie, Division 3 of the Washington Court of Appeals
indicated that an officer can lawfully arrest a drunk driver who was
taken from Washington to an Idaho hospital.123 The key for the Richie
court was the location of the violation.124 Conversely, in Barker, the
Washington State Supreme Court held that an Oregon officer lacked
authority to arrest a drunk driver who was apprehended after entering
Washington.125 The officer lacked the authority to arrest because she had
not completed the training program required under RCW 10.93.090.126
However, the Court was not reviewing whether the officer had statutory
authority to arrest the defendant in Washington under the Uniform
Act.127 In a footnote, the Court explicitly recognized that the 1998
amendment to the Uniform Act “clearly authorized” the officer in this
case to pursue a person she believed to be driving under the influence
and driving recklessly.128 Thus, both the Ritchie and Barker courts have
indicated drunk driving is a sufficient basis to justify fresh pursuit into a
foreign jurisdiction.129
C.

RCW 10.92.020 Extends the Rights of Washington Officers to
Certified Tribal Officers

Another way the Washington State Legislature broke down territorial
barriers to fresh pursuit is the extension of a peace officer’s authority to
tribal officers.130 The legislature distinguishes between a general
authority Washington peace officer, who is authorized to enforce the
State’s laws, and a “tribal police officer,” who enforces the criminal
laws of a federally-recognized tribe.131 To improve law enforcement on
reservations, the legislature enacted RCW 10.92.020, authorizing tribal

State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423 (2001).
121. 127 Wash. App. 935, 113 P.3d 1045 (2005).
122. 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423 (2001).
123. 127 Wash. App. at 942–43, 113 P.3d at 1049.
124. Id.
125. 143 Wash. 2d at 917–18, 25 P.3d at 424.
126. Id. at 922, 25 P.3d at 426.
127. Id. at 920 & n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 & n.1. The State did not file an answer to the defendant’s
petition for discretionary review. Id. at 920, 25 P.3d at 425.
128. Id. at 920 n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 n.1.
129. Id.; Richie, 127 Wash. App. at 942–43, 113 P.3d at 1049.
130. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010).
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010.
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officers to become general peace officers.132 Under the statute, a tribal
officer can make arrests under the color of Washington law.133
For the statute to apply, three things must occur. First, the tribe must
request the State of Washington to certify its law enforcement agents as
tribal officers.134 Second, the tribal government must submit proof of
public liability and property damage insurance.135 Third, the tribe must
reach an interlocal agreement with a local government law enforcement
agency for cooperative law enforcement.136
RCW 10.92.020 affords tribal officers the same powers as general
authority peace officers.137 Therefore, a tribal officer can enforce the
laws of Washington throughout the state in the instances enumerated in
RCW 10.93.070, one of which is fresh pursuit.138 The statute is clear that
the grant of power to tribes in no way expands tribal authority or allows
for tribal arrests outside of reservation land apart from the instances
outlined in RCW 10.93.070.139 However, the statute explicitly states that
nothing in it altered the inherent sovereign authority of the State’s
tribes.140 It only extended to tribal officers the authority of a general
authority Washington peace officer to enforce Washington law.141

132. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7 (“[Tribes] needed law enforcement just on
the reservation . . . . [Bad actors] would [leave] the reservation, [violate the law,] then come
back . . . . [T]here was difficulty [prosecuting] the [bad actors] because they were bouncing back
and forth [between jurisdictions] . . . . [After I was elected,] I started working on [tribal law
enforcement legislation and,] . . . now that there is cross-deputization[,] . . . it’s easier to make an
arrest and get a conviction.”).
133. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020.
134. Id. To accomplish this, the tribal government must enter a written agreement with the
Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.157(1)
(2010). The Training Commission provides law enforcement training for all criminal justice
personnel in Washington. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.200. To be certified as a tribal officer, one
must meet the same requirements as an individual who seeks certification as a general authority
peace officer. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.157(1)–(2). The applicant must also undergo a
background check, psychological examination, and a polygraph test. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.101.095.
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(2)(a).
136. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(10).
137. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(1).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(5) (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070(6); see supra note
111.
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(4); see supra note 111.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(7).
141. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(1).
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IV. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW, THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT
DECIDED THE THREE ERIKSEN CASES
The question of a tribal officer’s inherent authority to continue crossjurisdictional fresh pursuit arose in State v. Eriksen.142 On August 10,
2005, Officer Mike McSwain of the Lummi Nation Police Department
was patrolling the Lummi Reservation when an approaching vehicle
with its high beams on swerved across the center line and almost struck
the officer’s marked car.143 Officer McSwain turned his car around,
activated his overhead lights, and followed the other car.144 The pursued
vehicle did not stop until arriving at a gas station located off the
reservation.145 As Officer McSwain approached the vehicle, he observed
the driver, Loretta Lynn Eriksen, switch places with the front seat
passenger in an attempt to evade detection.146 After asking for Eriksen’s
license, Officer McSwain determined she was not a tribal member.147 He
noted that Eriksen “smelled strongly of intoxicants, had bloodshot and
watery eyes, and spoke in slightly slurred speech.”148 Officer McSwain
promptly called for a Whatcom County deputy sheriff.149 While waiting
for the deputy sheriff to arrive, he asked Eriksen to step from the car
and, without performing any sobriety tests or collecting any evidence,
put her in the back of his patrol car.150 When the deputy sheriff arrived,
the sheriff arrested Eriksen.151
After a trial in Whatcom County District Court, a jury convicted
Eriksen of driving under the influence.152 At trial, she moved to suppress
evidence and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that
Officer McSwain did not have the authority to stop and detain her off
tribal land.153 No party questioned the presence of probable cause for a
142. State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 507, 259 P.3d 1079, 1079–80 (2011).
143. Id. at 507–08. The Lummi Nation Code of Laws 6.04.050(a) (2008) mandates that drivers
use low beams within 500 feet of oncoming vehicles.
144. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 508, 259 P.3d at 1080.
145. Id. Under Lummi law, eluding an officer is a Class B offense, one step below a felony.
Lummi Nation Code of Laws 6A.02.110 (2008); Lummi Nation Code of Laws 5.10.090 (2008).
146. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 508, 259 P.3d at 1080.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 508–09, 259 P.3d at 1080.
151. Id. at 509, 259 P.3d at 1080.
152. Id.
153. Id.

11 - Naud Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

FLEEING EAST FROM INDIAN COUNTRY

12/7/2012 7:40 PM

1269

Terry stop,154 or that the Lummi tribe lacked criminal jurisdiction over
Eriksen.155 The district court denied the motion, and, on appeal, the
Whatcom County Superior Court upheld the conviction.156 Both courts
reasoned that the Lummi Nation’s inherent sovereign power authorizes
tribal police to enforce internal criminal laws by pursuing offenders who
leave the reservation.157
A.

In Eriksen I, the Washington State Supreme Court Upheld the
Arrest Because the Canons of Interpretation and a Tribe’s Inherent
Sovereign Authority Mandate Its Ability to Enforce Its Own Laws

In 2009, the Washington State Supreme Court granted discretionary
review of the Whatcom County Superior Court’s decision to affirm
Eriksen’s conviction in the first State v. Eriksen (Eriksen I).158 A
unanimous court upheld the arrest.159 Justice Sanders, writing for the
Court, held that “tribal officers have the inherent sovereign authority and
statutory authority to continue fresh pursuit of motorists who break
traffic laws on the reservation and then drive off the reservation.”160 The
Court based its decision on a tribe’s inherent power to uphold the law on
the reservation and the legislature’s effort to improve cross-jurisdictional
crime prevention.161
Based on Schmuck and Ortiz-Barraza, the Court stated that tribes
have the power to detain non-Indians who violate the law on public
roads within the reservation.162 A tribe’s authority over events occurring
on its land is an inherent power that has never been extinguished.163
Thus, tribes have an inherent interest in protecting self-government

154. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (“We merely hold today that where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot . . . [the officer can] make[ ] reasonable inquiries.”).
155. See Brief for Lummi Nation as Amicus Curiae Supporting the State at 2, State v. Eriksen
(Eriksen I), 166 Wash. 2d 953, 216 P.3d 382 (2009), superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen II),
170 Wash. 2d 209, 241 P.3d 399 (2010) (No. 80653-5); Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 507, 259 P.3d
at 1079–80.
156. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 509, 259 P.3d at 1080.
157. Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d at 959, 216 P.3d at 385.
158. 166 Wash. 2d 953, 959, 216 P.3d 382, 385 (2009), superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen
II), 170 Wash. 2d 209, 241 P.3d 399 (2010).
159. Id. at 957, 974, 216 P.3d at 384, 393.
160. Id. at 957, 216 P.3d at 384 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id. at 973–74, 216 P.3d at 393.
162. Id. at 961, 216 P.3d at 386 (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 962, 216 P.3d at 387.

11 - Naud Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1270

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/7/2012 7:40 PM

[Vol. 87:1251

through the creation and enforcement of an internal criminal code.164 In
fact, tribal parties to Point Elliott affirmatively agreed to deliver lawbreakers to the proper authorities.165 In the particular instance of a
fleeing drunk driver, it is only through detaining violators that a tribe can
simultaneously protect its own interests and uphold its duty to aid law
enforcement.166
The Court next applied the second Montana exception.167 The Court
expressly identified that an inability to enforce a traffic code is a direct
threat to a tribe’s political integrity.168 The inherent power of selfgovernance is only practical if the tribe can enforce its internal laws.169
The Court reasoned that if it authorized non-Indians to escape
prosecution simply by successfully winning a race to the reservation
boundary, it would undermine the holding from Schmuck.170
In the last part of its analysis, the Court found that the Powers Act
gives tribes the statutory authority to enforce their internal laws in the
event of fresh pursuit off the reservation.171 The Court contended that a
general authority Washington law enforcement agency is any “political
subdivision . . . having as its primary function the detection and
apprehension of persons committing infractions or violating the traffic or
criminal laws in general . . . .”172 Because the legislature directed courts
to “liberally construe” the provisions of the Powers Act,173 tribal officers
were general authority officers and could cross-jurisdictional boundaries
when in fresh pursuit.174
B.

In Eriksen II, the Court Upheld the Arrest Because a Tribe Retains
Its Inherent Sovereign Authority to Enforce Its Own Laws.
In 2010, Ms. Eriksen petitioned for reconsideration175 and the Court

164. Id. at 963, 216 P.3d at 387.
165. Id. at 962–63, 216 P.3d at 387 (citing State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 385, 850 P.2d
1332, 1338 (1993)).
166. Id. at 965–66, 216 P.3d at 388–89.
167. Id. at 964, 216 P.3d at 388 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
168. Id. at 965, 216 P.3d at 388.
169. Id. (quoting Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 392, 850 P.2d at 1342).
170. Id. at 966, 216 P.3d at 389.
171. Id. at 972–74, 216 P.3d at 392–93.
172. Id. at 971, 216 P.3d at 391(emphasis omitted) (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1)
(2010)).
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.001(3).
174. Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d at 973–74, 216 P.3d at 393.
175. Motion to Reconsider of Petitioner at 1, Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d 953, 216 P.3d 382 (No. 06-
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granted review in the second State v. Eriksen (Eriksen II).176 Justice
Sanders, writing for a 6-3 court,177 again affirmed the conviction,
holding that tribal officers possess the inherent authority to continue
fresh pursuit off reservation land.178
Justice Sanders replicated much of the Court’s analysis from
Eriksen I.179 In Eriksen II, the Court also explained that a determination
of inherent sovereign power is based on “the character of the power that
the tribe seeks to exercise, not merely the location of events.”180 It is the
vital nature of a tribe’s ability to enforce the law, protect the safety of
tribal members, and control events on tribal land that mandates the
recognition of the inherent sovereign authority to continue fresh pursuit
of a suspected criminal, in particular a drunk driver.181 However, in a
reversal from Eriksen I, the Court did not assert that a tribal officer is by
definition a general authority Washington peace officer under the
Powers Act.182 The Court only noted that the Powers Act does not
explicitly bar a tribal officer’s authority to detain after fresh pursuit.183
Justice Fairhurst authored the dissenting opinion.184 Although the
dissenters agreed that a tribal officer may pursue a driver off the
reservation, they argued that there is no authority to support a
subsequent detention once a lack of tribal status is ascertained.185 The
mandate to interpret treaties liberally and resolve ambiguities in favor of
1-00516-6) (Eriksen argued the Court incorrectly equated the Lummi tribal police to a general
authority Washington law enforcement agency under WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.020(1) because the
tribe is not a political subdivision of the state, nor does it enforce state laws. Furthermore, like the
Oregon police officer in Barker, the tribe decided not to comply with the certification requirements
under Chapter 10.93, thus limiting its ability to continue fresh pursuit.). The Washington State
Supreme Court will grant a motion for reconsideration if the party has demonstrated the Court
overlooked or misapprehended the law or a fact. WASH. R. APP. P. 12.4.
176. 170 Wash. 2d 209, 215, 241 P.3d 399, 402 (2010), superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen
III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011).
177. Id. at 226, 241 P.3d at 408 (joined by Justices C. Johnson, Chambers, Owens, J. Johnson,
and Stephens).
178. Id. at 226, 241 P.3d at 407.
179. See supra Part IV.A for Justice Sanders’s analysis in Eriksen I, 166 Wash. 2d 953, 216 P.3d
382. Among other determinations, the Court recognized both a tribe’s right to protect selfgovernment by enforcing law within the reservation and the duty created under Point Elliott.
180. 170 Wash. 2d at 216, 241 P.3d at 402 (quoting John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 752 (Alaska
1999)).
181. Id. at 218–22, 241 P.3d at 403–05 (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 225–26, 241 P.3d at 407.
183. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1) (2010)).
184. Id. at 226–30, 241 P.3d at 408–09 (Fairhurst, J., dissenting) (joined by Chief Justice Madsen
and Justice Alexander).
185. Id. at 227, 241 P.3d at 409.

11 - Naud Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

1272

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

12/7/2012 7:40 PM

[Vol. 87:1251

tribes is “not a blank check to rewrite the language of a treaty, even to
avoid an injustice.”186 The tribal officer may only notify a general
authority Washington peace officer that a car with a particular
description is travelling down a road.187 The dissenters acknowledged
that their conclusion requires an officer to allow a drunk driver to
continue driving, but stressed that current law dictated invalidating the
arrest.188 To prevent this result in the future, they recommended that
either tribes have their officers certified under RCW 10.92.020 or the
legislature extend statutory fresh pursuit to tribal officers.189
C.

In Eriksen III, the Court Declared the Arrest Invalid Because
Tribal Officers Lack the Authority to Detain Outside the Territorial
Limits of Their Jurisdiction

In 2011, Ms. Eriksen moved for reconsideration a second time,190 and
the Washington State Supreme Court granted review in Eriksen III.191
For Eriksen, the third time was the charm, as Justice Fairhurst, writing
for a 5-4 court,192 invalidated the conviction and held that fresh pursuit
off tribal land is not within the inherent sovereign power of an Indian
tribe.193

186. Id. at 229, 241 P.3d at 409 (citing Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S.
335, 353 (1945)).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 230, 241 P.3d at 409.
190. Motion to Reconsider of Petitioner at 1, Eriksen II, 170 Wash. 2d 209, 241 P.3d 399 (No.
80653-5) (Eriksen argued there was no factual support for the application of common law fresh
pursuit as the justices only assumed felony eluding a police officer occurred here. Without a
felony—and reckless driving is not one—there were no grounds to allow cross-jurisdictional
pursuit. Because a Lummi officer is not a general authority Washington police officer, the Court
could not find statutory basis to allow fresh pursuit, and, as Eriksen asserted, common law fresh
pursuit does not survive WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020. Also, she claimed that Eriksen II frustrates
the purpose of that statute because it would not hold tribal officers to the same training standards as
general authority Washington police officers. Next, she contended the application of the second
Montana exception was misplaced because the regulation of fishing at issue in that case was still
within the boundaries of Indian Country. Non-tribal land within a reservation is different from nontribal land outside a reservation. And finally, she posited that the Treaty of Point Elliott did not
expressly authorize the detention of non-members off Indian land.).
191. 172 Wash. 2d 506, 509, 259 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2011).
192. Id. at 506, 516, 259 P.3d at 1079, 1084 (joined by Chief Justice Madsen, Justices J. Johnson,
Stephens, and Wiggins).
193. Id. at 515–16, 259 P.3d at 1084. In the time between Eriksen II and Eriksen III, the only
change on the Court was that Justice Wiggins replaced Justice Sanders (who wrote the majority
opinions in Eriksen I and Eriksen II), and he voted to overturn the conviction. Besides this single
personnel change, Justices J. Johnson and Stephens shifted from upholding the arrest to invalidating
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The Court reversed the conviction for three main reasons: (1) “the
concept of territorial jurisdiction necessarily limits” the tribe’s authority
to enforce tribal law and protect the safety of tribal members; (2)
Washington provides an avenue through which tribal officers can be
certified as general authority Washington peace officers with the
authority to continue fresh pursuit of violators; and (3) Article IX of
Point Elliott is designed to prevent tribes from granting safe harbor to
non-Indians seeking asylum from criminal prosecutions and does not
pertain to persons who leave tribal jurisdiction before detention.194 The
Court cited Barker for the proposition that territorial boundaries limit
law enforcement officers when neither statute nor common law
authorizes cross-jurisdictional pursuit.195 Additionally, the Court
contended Settler only supports off-reservation arrests for violations of
tribal fishing regulations at “usual and accustomed fishing sites”
reserved in Point Elliott.196 If the officer had detained Eriksen on the
reservation, then the provisions of Point Elliott would govern the
detention of non-members as in Schmuck.197 The Court next dismissed
the application of the second Montana exception because that case was
about civil, not criminal, jurisdiction.198 Finally, echoing the dissent in
Eriksen II, the Court acknowledged the negative policy results of its
decision, but reasoned that the relevant law required this outcome.199
Justice Owens authored a dissenting opinion.200 In the opinion, the
it, while Justice Alexander went the opposite direction. Compare Eriksen II, 170 Wash. 2d at 212,
226, 230, 241 P.3d at 400, 408–09, with Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 516, 523, 259 P.3d at 1084,
1087.
194. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 509–14, 259 P.3d at 1081–83.
195. Id. at 510, 512, 259 P.3d at 1081–82 (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 512–13, 259 P.3d at 1082 (citing Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 231 (9th Cir. 1974)).
197. Id. at 513, 259 P.3d at 1082–83.
198. Id. at 513–14, 259 P.3d at 1083.
199. Id. at 514–15, 259 P.3d at 1083.
200. Id. at 518–23, 259 P.3d at 1085–87 (Owens, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices C. Johnson
and Chambers). Justice Alexander dissented separately. Id. at 516–18, 259 P.3d at 1084–85
(Alexander, J., dissenting). In his opinion, the conviction should be affirmed because the officer’s
detention of Eriksen was a valid citizen’s arrest. Id. at 518, 259 P.3d at 1085. He cited State v.
Malone, 106 Wash. 2d 607, 609 n.1, 724 P.2d 364, 365 n.1 (1986) as support for the well-settled
common law standard that an individual can arrest “a person who is committing a felony or a
misdemeanor in the citizen’s presence if the offense is a breach of the peace.” Eriksen III, 172
Wash. 2d at 516, 259 P.3d at 1084 (footnote omitted) (citing Malone, 106 Wash. 2d at 609 n.1, 724
P.2d at 365 n.1). In Malone, an officer from Idaho pursued a driver into Washington in a similar
manner to Officer McSwain’s pursuit of Eriksen and the Court deemed the subsequent detention a
valid citizen’s arrest. Id. In Justice Alexander’s opinion, driving under the influence is a breach of
peace because the act creates the risk of serious harm. Id. at 516–17, 259 P.3d at 1084–85.
Furthermore, Justice Alexander argued the arrest was valid because the tribal officer did not gather
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dissenters argued that the ability of a tribe to detain a non-Indian who
threatens the welfare of tribal members is well established in state and
federal law.201 The dissenters noted that a court must not interpret
inherent tribal authority in terms of state statutes, but interpret statutes in
relation to the tribe’s inherent authority.202 Therefore, the majority’s
decision undermines the federal and state legal foundations of inherent
sovereign authority.203
V.

ERIKSEN III IS BOTH CONTRARY TO STATE AND
FEDERAL GUIDELINES AND DETRIMENTAL TO PUBLIC
POLICY AND SAFETY

The Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in Eriksen III
contains flawed legal analysis and ignores the public policy directives of
the Washington State Legislature. First, a court cannot read a state
statute to limit a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority.204 The Court did
this when it stated that a tribal officer cannot continue fresh pursuit if the
tribe fails to achieve certification under RCW 10.92.020.205 A tribe
retains all rights not relinquished in a treaty, expressly taken by
Congress, or inconsistent with its status as a domestic dependent
nation.206 Neither a Congressional statute nor Point Elliott has removed
the power of detention from tribes. In fact, Point Elliott placed this
burden upon them.207 Second, the Court’s interpretation of RCW
any evidence besides what an average citizen could in a similar situation. Id. at 517–18, 259 P.3d at
1084–85.
201. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 518, 520, 259 P.3d at 1085–87 (citations omitted). For this
proposition, Justice Owens cited to the cases covered throughout this Comment, including State v.
Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332 (1993), and Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435
U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States
v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 518–19, 259 P.3d at 1085–86 (citations
omitted).
202. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 522, 259 P.3d at 1087 (citing Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
203. See id. at 522–23, 259 P.3d at 1087.
204. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42, 151 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384
(1905).
205. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d at 514, 259 P.3d at 1083.
206. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
207. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 384–85, 850 P.2d 1332, 1338 (stating that Article IX
requires tribes to detain and transfer non-member violators to state authorities); Point Elliott, supra
note 96, art. IX.
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10.92.020 as a limitation on tribal police power runs counter to the
statute’s express language and the legislature’s intent. Third, the Court’s
contention that territorial boundaries necessarily limit jurisdiction is
unfounded within the precedent the Court cited. Finally, Eriksen III
incentivizes all non-Indian violators, not just drunk drivers, to attempt
flight from pursuing tribal officers. This can lead to high-speed pursuit,
endangering the lives of citizens both on and off the reservation. Based
on these four points, it is evident the Court both performed the wrong
analysis for inherent sovereign authority and should have upheld the
arrest and conviction of Loretta Lynn Eriksen.208
A.

Federal Law Does Not Limit a Tribe’s Authority to Pursue a NonIndian Violator, Providing No Basis for a State to Restrict This
Ability

A tribe retains the inherent sovereign authority to enforce laws and
ensure safety on its reservation.209 A state’s interests, even if it has
assumed jurisdiction over tribal reservations under Public Law 280, do
not destroy a tribe’s sovereignty over both its members and its
territory.210 By definition, tribes maintain their inherent authority over
the aspects of self-government not expressly given away by treaty, taken
by Congressional statute, or implicitly removed as a result of their
dependent status.211 The authority to continue fresh pursuit off a
reservation, ascertain the status of the violator, and then contact a state
law enforcement officer, has never been expressly removed, and is
consistent with both the reserved right to protect member safety and the
nature of being a dependent nation.212

208. It is not clear why the conviction of Eriksen was invalid once the arrest was declared invalid.
An unlawful arrest does not necessarily derail a conviction. It is the inadmissibility of any evidence
gathered pursuant to that arrest that can ruin a conviction. See State v. Melrose, 2 Wash. App. 824,
828, 470 P.2d 552, 555 (1970). Officer McSwain did not gather any evidence beyond simple
observation before the deputy sheriff arrived and placed Eriksen under arrest. See Eriksen III, 172
Wash. 2d at 508–09, 259 P.3d at 1080. The deputy sheriff performed all sobriety tests. See id. The
majority did not address this issue in Eriksen III. See id. at 506–16, 259 P.3d at 1079–84.
209. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (“Essentially, absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
566 (1981) (recognizing the second exception).
210. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980); United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
211. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
212. See infra Parts V.A.1–.3.
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The Tribal Parties to the Treaty of Point Elliot Did Not Cede the
Ability to Protect Safety on Their Reservations or Aide States in
Enforcing the Law

The Eriksen III majority suggested that the only concern addressed in
Article IX of Point Elliott is the fear that American criminals would seek
asylum on reservations.213 The Court also insinuated that only those
rights expressly reserved in a treaty are protected rights.214 While Justice
Fairhurst is correct that the Indian canons of interpretation are “not a
blank check to rewrite the [treaty],”215 a court should not then read
concessions of rights not stated in the treaty. According to federal law,
absent an explicit provision, courts must liberally construe treaties in
favor of the Indians and as the tribes would have understood them.216 In
1832, twenty-three years prior to Point Elliott, the U.S. Supreme Court
suggested that the correct interpretation of treaties is as grants of rights
by the tribes.217 Rights not expressly given to the United States are
reserved to tribes.218 Nowhere in Point Elliott do the tribes expressly
relinquish the right to inform U.S. officials of law violations; in fact,
they affirmatively agreed to this burden.219
Courts must interpret Point Elliot from the perspective of how the
tribes understood it.220 According to the terms of the treaty, the tribes
agreed to relocate to reservations, ceding their claims to the land they

213. 172 Wash. 2d at 513, 259 P.3d at 1082.
214. See id. at 512–13, 259 P.3d at 1082–83.
215. State v. Eriksen (Eriksen II), 170 Wash. 2d 209, 229, 241 P.3d 399, 409 (2010) (Fairhurst,
J., dissenting) (citing Nw. Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945)),
superseded by, State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III) 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011).
216. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985); State v. Buchanan, 138
Wash. 2d 186, 202, 978 P.2d 1070, 1078 (1999); State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 385, 850
P.2d 1332, 1338 (1993); see text accompanying supra notes 93–94 for discussion about the liberal
canons of interpretation for Indian treaties.
217. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 552–54 (1832), abrogation recognized in
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present:
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381,
402 (1993) (“[In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall] conceptualized an Indian treaty as a grant of
rights from a tribe to the United State, rather than a cession of all tribal rights to the United States,
which then granted back certain concessions to the tribe.”).
218. Frickey, supra note 217, at 402.
219. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 384–86, 850 P.2d at 1338 (stating that Article IX requires
tribes to detain and transfer non-member violators to state authorities); Point Elliott, supra note 96,
art. IX.
220. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 385, 850 P.2d at 1338; see text accompanying supra notes 93–94
for discussion about the liberal canons of interpretation for Indian treaties.
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occupied, and in return received the protection of the United States,221
monetary payments, the guarantee of land, and access to traditional
fishing and hunting grounds.222 The agreement to not “shelter or
conceal” law violators is part of a larger section in which the tribes
accepted the U.S. government as an arbitrator in their tribal disputes and
consented to report all crimes to the government’s agent.223 Tribal
acceptance of U.S. guardianship, and agreement to reveal law violators,
was a way of showing allegiance.224 The protection of U.S. law would
have been of little comfort to the tribes if a violator escaped liability
simply by fleeing to U.S. soil.225
Contemporary concepts of criminal jurisdiction within Indian Country
support this interpretation of tribal understanding. For example,
Congress enacted the Indian Country Crimes Act,226 which created
federal jurisdiction over any cross-racial crimes in Indian Country.227
This law was a direct descendant of the Trade and Intercourse statutes
that attempted to control lawless whites and ensure peaceful relations on
the Western frontier.228 Rather than focus solely on asylum seekers,
these statutes sought to limit gaps in prosecutions for cross-racial
crimes.229 It is clear that Congress directed efforts toward curtailing
lawlessness within tribal territory.230
221. See generally Point Elliott, supra note 96. “The said tribes . . . promise to be friendly with all
citizens [of the United States], and they pledge themselves to commit no depredations on the
property of such citizens. Should any one or more of them violate this pledge, and the fact be
satisfactorily proven before the agent, the property taken shall be returned . . . . And if any of the
said Indians commit depredations on other Indians within the Territory the same rule shall prevail as
that prescribed in this article in cases of depredations against citizens.” Id. art. IX.
222. Id. art. III, V, VII.
223. Id. art. IX; see supra note 97 for full text of Article IX.
224. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 569 (1883) (The bad men clauses are an
“acknowledgment of their allegiance, as Indians, to the laws of the United States, made or to be
made in the exercise of legislative authority over them as such.”), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153 (2006), as recognized in United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). See supra
note 96 for background on the establishment of reservations.
225. This is in line with Duro, and many other cases, in which the Court said tribes must maintain
the power to detain non-members to prevent impunity for lack of criminal jurisdiction. Duro v.
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 696–97 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
226. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
227. Id.
228. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 92 (1984).
229. See generally Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556; United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
230. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (extending federal criminal jurisdiction to cover
crimes committed by one Indian against another); 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
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Other tribal treaties offer examples of intentions to protect law and
order upon tribal land.231 In 1868, the Navajo agreed to relocate to a
reservation.232 As part of the agreement, the U.S. government promised
to punish violators of U.S. laws, either white or Indian, if they
committed a cross-racial crime.233 This so-called “bad men clause”
reflects the ideas expressed in the Indian Country Crimes Act. The
understanding was that violators of U.S. law on reservation land faced
criminal prosecution.234 Because concerns of lawlessness pervaded the
period, a court should view Article IX as a shorthand version of similar
efforts to enforce law within Indian Country.
Furthermore, the language of Article IX does not support Eriksen III’s
interpretation.235 The treaty requires tribes to identify violators but does
not geographically limit this duty. The language in no way limits its
application to situations of persons seeking asylum within the
reservation. The treaty did not expressly remove the power to report
crime; in fact, the tribes expressly accepted the burden.236 As the
Washington State Supreme Court stated in Schmuck, Article IX instructs
tribes to detain non-Indian law violators and transfer them to state
officers.237 This conclusion is founded in both the language of the treaty
and in an analysis under the Indian canons of interpretation.238
Nowhere in Point Elliott do the party tribes relinquish the right to
pursue law violators. In fact, they took on the burden of reporting crime
to the United States. Without express relinquishment, tribes retain
aspects of sovereign power. Only a subsequent express act of Congress
can remove the reserved right to “deliver [violators] up to the authorities
for trial.”239

231. See Treaty with the Cherokees, art. V, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478; Treaty with the Choctaw,
art. XIII, Oct. 18, 1820, 7 Stat. 210; Treaty with the Wyandots, Delawares, Shawanoes, Ottawa,
Chipewas, Putawatimes, Miamis, Eel-river, Weea’s, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias, art.
VI, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49; Treaty with the Chickasaws, art. V, Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24.
232. Treaty with the Navajo, art. II, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
233. Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. at 557–58.
234. 18 U.S.C. § 1152; Treaty with the Navajo, supra note 232, art. I.
235. See supra note 97 for full text of Article IX.
236. Point Elliott, supra note 96, art. IX.
237. 121 Wash. 2d 373, 387, 850 P.2d 1332, 1339 (1993).
238. See generally Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 850 P.2d 1332.
239. Point Elliott, supra note 96, art. IX; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978),
superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S.
193 (2004).
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Congress Has Not Limited a Tribal Officer’s Ability to Detain
Violators and Transfer Them to Proper Authorities

A tribe retains powers not ceded in a treaty unless Congress explicitly
removes that right or abrogates the treaty.240 Until Congress speaks on
the matter, a party tribe to Point Elliot retains the right and the obligation
to help the United States identify law violators.241 Washington cannot
remove reserved treaty rights from a tribe that Congress itself has not
taken, nor can the State undermine Congressional goals in Indian
affairs.242 Congress has not explicitly restricted a tribe’s authority to
detain individuals who violated law on the reservations simply because
pursuit continued off-reservation. Congress has only expressly
acknowledged a need to improve law enforcement within Indian
Country.243
One example of Congress’s efforts to improve law and order within
Indian Country is Public Law 280.244 In 1953, Congress sought to
combat perceived lawlessness on reservations by authorizing states to
assume criminal and (limited) civil jurisdiction over reservations within
their borders.245 Prior to Public Law 280, there were prosecutorial gaps
for criminal offenses on reservations.246 Federal prosecutors were not
geared to handle minor criminal prosecutions,247 and tribes only had

240. See supra Part I; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903), abrogated by
Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
241. See supra Part V.A.1.
242. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987); White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42, 151 (1980); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384
(1905).
243. See supra Part V.A.1; see also Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006) (extending
federal criminal jurisdiction to cover crimes committed by one Indian against another); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006). See generally Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27 (outlining
Congressional efforts to use Public Law 280 to combat lawlessness on Indian reservations).
244. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360; see text accompanying supra notes 23–30 for
discussion of the enactment of Public Law 280.
245. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1406.
246. See id. at 1412–13, 1416. However, an unintended result of Public Law 280 may have been
to increase the lawlessness on the reservation because many states were unwilling to pick up the
duties once the federal government stopped providing law enforcement. Id. at 1416–18, 1441.
247. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1976) (“Federal law is not designed to
cover the range of conduct normally regulated by local governments. Minor offenses committed by
non-Indians within Indian reservations frequently go unpunished and thus unregulated.”), rev’d,
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
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jurisdiction over Indian violators.248 Compounding the problem, tribes
often lacked the resources to prosecute major offenses and could only
render limited sentences under the Indian Civil Rights Act.249 Congress’s
solution was to substitute state authority for federal.250 This
interpretation of the intent behind Public Law 280 is in line with
Washington case law.251
The enactment of Public Law 280 is not the only evidence of
Congress’s goal to improve law and order on reservations. In her article,
Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian
Country,252 Professor Carole Goldberg-Ambrose argued that states that
have assumed jurisdiction under Public Law 280 are reluctant to direct
their full effort toward combating crime in Indian Country.253
Furthermore, the states and tribes do not receive pre-Public Law 280
levels of financial support from the federal government because that
money is concentrated on law enforcement efforts in states lacking
jurisdiction over Indian Country.254 The lack of funding is particularly
evident in tribal law enforcement and tribal courts.255 Because state
jurisdiction only exacerbated lawlessness on reservations,256 Congress
has recognized the ability of states to retrocede jurisdiction to the federal
government.257
While Professor Goldberg-Ambrose’s study focused on California,
Washington State has also felt the negative effects of continued
jurisdictional gaps.258 To alleviate this problem, the Washington State
248. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1415.
249. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7)(B)–(D) (2006) (limiting the extent of punishment a tribal court can
mete out for any one crime to one year or a fine of $5000 for first time offenders and minor crimes,
and three years or a fine of $15,000 for repeat offenders or major offenses).
250. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1415.
251. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 394, 850 P.2d 1332, 1343 (1993).
252. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997).
253. Id. at 1416–18, 1441 (suggesting that there were direct and indirect negative effects on the
nature of law enforcement within Indian Country as a result of Public Law 280).
254. Id. at 1417.
255. Id. at 1418.
256. Id. at 1416–19.
257. 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (2006).
258. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7. According to Representative McCoy:
[Tribes, like the Tulalip, were] working with county sheriffs on law enforcement
issues. . . . [On the Tulalip Reservation,] there was only one [state] officer in the whole north
country sector at night. During day time, there might be two officers in the whole north country
sector. . . . That’s a lot of ground to cover . . . . That one officer’s doing the best he could but
[there were] still issues. . . . [Bad actors] would [leave] the reservation, [violate the law,] then
come back . . . .
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Legislature sought to improve law enforcement upon tribal land within
the state.259 For instance, the impetus behind RCW 10.92.020 was threefold: (1) to prevent criminals from hopping between jurisdictions to
avoid prosecution; (2) to remove reliance on the availability of peace
officers to arrest violators; and (3) to force local law enforcement
agencies to negotiate interlocal agreements with tribes.260 The
legislature, too, has created a process through which tribes can request
retrocession of jurisdiction.261
Congress has not expressly addressed the question of tribal crossjurisdictional fresh pursuit. What Congress has expressly demonstrated
is intent to improve law enforcement within reservations.262 Public Law
280 illustrates this effort.263 States cannot contravene Congressional
goals without express permission.264 Therefore, the State of Washington
. . . [Also,] Domestic Violence . . . was a big problem because of the mixed relationships
[between] a non-Indian and an Indian. . . . [For instance, if] an Indian female [was] getting beat
up by a [non-Indian, the tribe could not] do anything about it. . . . [Tribes, in general, also] had
major drug [trafficking] problems. . . .
. . . [In the instance of a traffic stop,] before cross-deputization, if there was a non-Indian
involved, the only thing [tribal officers] could do [was] detain, and then . . . call the Sheriff’s
Department or State Patrol [to inform them that a non-Indian had been] apprehended. Could
have been a DUI or speeding or whatever, but if [the state officer was] busy and nobody came,
well, [a tribal officer] can’t detain forever. All [the tribal officer] can do is record . . . the stop
and let the [non-Indian] go . . . .
Id.
259. See supra Part III.C for discussion of the Washington State Legislature’s efforts to improve
law enforcement on Indian reservations, in particular, its enactment of WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 10.92.010–.020 (2010).
260. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7. Representative McCoy described the
impetus behind WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020:
[In WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020,] there is a process that if [a local] sheriff fails to negotiate
[an interlocal agreement with a neighboring tribe] fairly and equally, . . . a
mechanism . . . triggers [as a legal hammer]. . . . [Outside of that, the] impetus [behind] the bill
was [tribes had] bad actors that were bouncing back and forth [between jurisdictions], trying to
use the shield of [tribal] trust land [to prevent successful prosecutions] . . . .
. . . [Also], now that there is cross-deputization, . . . it’s easier to make an arrest and get a
conviction. . . . [B]efore cross-deputization, if there was a non-Indian involved, the only thing
[tribal officers] could do [was] detain, and then . . . call to the Sheriff’s Department or State
Patrol [to inform them that a non-Indian had been] apprehended. Could have been a DUI or
speeding or whatever, but if [the state officer was] busy and nobody came, well, [a tribal
officer] can’t detain forever. All [the tribal officer] can do is record . . . the stop and let the
[non-Indian] go, which was serving no one’s best interests.
Id.; see infra Part V.B.
261. ESHB 2233, ch. 48 § 1, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified as WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)). The governor has discretion to accept or decline the tribal request within
one year of the request. Id.
262. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152–1153, 1162 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006).
263. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1406.
264. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141–42, 151 (1980);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).
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cannot limit a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to detain and reveal
non-Indian violators unless such a right is removed as a consequence of
the tribe’s dependent status.265
3.

In the Absence of Congressional Action, a Court Must Analyze the
Importance of the Right in Question and Its Relation to a Tribe’s
Dependent Status

The last way to define a tribe’s inherent sovereign authority is to
analyze whether the right is inconsistent with its dependent status. The
U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Oliphant that a tribe is implicitly
divested of a right when that right is inconsistent with an overriding
federal interest.266 Additionally, in Montana, the Court stated that tribal
authority does not cover rights that are unnecessary to safeguard selfgovernment or regulate internal relations.267 However, the Court did
declare two exceptions, the second of which instructs that tribes retain
authority over actions that “threaten[ ] or ha[ve] some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of
the tribe.”268 Without the ability to detain violators, tribes are deprived of
their basic right to determine the conditions upon which a person can
enter a reservation and to exclude people who violate those terms.269
This right is necessary to the survival of tribal government and is not
implicitly removed by dependent status.270
A tribe possesses the ability to enforce their own law. As described
above in Part V.A.2, improving law enforcement within Indian Country
is an overriding federal interest. Therefore, a tribe’s interest in upholding
law and order is consistent with a federal interest. Also, a tribe’s
inability to prevent drunk driving is detrimental to both its selfgovernment and safety because it would render its legal code “virtually
meaningless.”271 Granted, the U.S. Supreme Court in Strate indicated
that mere “careless” driving is not sufficient to register as a threat to

265. United States. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (citation omitted), superseded by
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
266. 435 U.S. 191, 209 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized
in. Lara, 541 U.S. 193.
267. 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
268. Id. at 566; see text accompanying supra notes 62–72 for a discussion of the post-Montana
case history regarding the second exception.
269. Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 1975).
270. Id. at 1179.
271. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 381–83, 850 P.2d 1332, 1336–37 (1993).
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tribal autonomy.272 However, limiting a tribe’s ability to prevent
criminal driving undermines the integrity of tribal sovereignty.273 Thus,
a tribe’s authority to enforce the law is one of the most important rights
it retains.274
Furthermore, the second Montana exception simply provides
guidance as to the outer extent of a tribe’s retention of authority to
regulate on-reservation conduct of non-Indians.275 Despite being a
criminal matter, cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of a drunk driver
implicates interests that can extend beyond artificial borders.276 Eriksen
III’s encouragement of non-Indian flight for reservation boundaries
seriously undermines a tribe’s ability to manage its territory.277 Nothing
prevents a released violator from returning to a reservation. It was
incorrect for the Eriksen III Court to flatly dismiss the second Montana
exception. A tribe’s interest in upholding law and order on its
reservation is not limited to its territorial jurisdiction.278 The ability to

272. 520 U.S. 438, 457–58 (1997); see text accompanying supra notes 69–70 for discussion of
how Strate narrowed the application of the second Montana exception.
273. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 381, 383, 850 P.2d at 1336–37. Courts have previously
granted exceptions to federal Indian law tenets in order to prevent drunk drivers. Compare United
States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605–06 (1916) (holding that because the federal government lacks
jurisdiction to prosecute Indian-on-Indian crime, it also lacked jurisdiction where there was no nonIndian victim, i.e. victimless crimes), with United States v. Thunder Hawk, 127 F.3d 705, 709 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that Quiver should be limited to only domestic relations, and allowing for
federal prosecution of a drunk driver).
274. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1012–13 (9th Cir. 1976), rev’d, Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006),
as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); see also Ortiz-Barraza, 512 F.2d at
1179.
275. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 391, 850 P.2d at 1341.
276. See In re Richie, 127 Wash. App. 935, 942–43, 113 P.3d 1045, 1049 (2005) (recognizing
that a Washington officer can arrest a suspected drunk driver in Idaho); see also City of Wenatchee
v. Durham, 43 Wash. App. 547, 550, 718 P.2d 819, 821 (1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010), as recognized in Vance v. State, 116 Wash. App. 412, 65 P.3d 668
(2003).
277. See Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d at 381–83, 386–91, 850 P.2d at 1336–42; see text
accompanying supra notes 80–86 for discussion of the Schmuck Court’s finding that a tribe must be
able to enforce its laws or else non-Indians can act with impunity upon a reservation; see infra Part
V.D.
278. See Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 237 (9th Cir. 1974) (“The mere fact that the fishing
may take place off the reservation does not make the regulation of treaty fishing any less an internal
matter. The locus of the act is not conclusive.”) (citing Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir.
1965)). At least one federal court has stated that tribes have the inherent power to uphold law and
safety within their borders through cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit of law violators. See United
States v. Medearis, 236 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981–82 (D.S.D. 2002) (ruling that an arrest by tribal
officers that occurred outside the Rosebud Sioux reservation was unlawful because the car was
parked at a convenience store and the driver was not attempting to evade police).
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prevent crime on the reservation, even if done through off-reservation
detention, is a right consistent with a tribe’s dependent status.
Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Wheeler analysis, neither Congress
nor Point Elliott indicates tribal officers do not have the authority to
continue cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit and detain law violators. Also,
the ability to uphold internal law is consistent with a tribe’s dependent
status, implicating vital tribal interests that can extend beyond concepts
of territorial limits. A court must view any state statute against this
background.
B.

RCW 10.92.020 Does Not Inhibit a Tribe’s Authority to Detain a
Non-Member Violator

The Washington State Supreme Court must interpret state statutes to
give effect to the plain meaning of the words and the intent of the
legislature as either explicitly expressed or as gathered throughout
related statutes.279 This canon of interpretation directs the Court to find
that RCW 10.92.020 sought to expand a tribal officer’s authority, not
reduce it.
The plain language of the statute mandates the Court to view RCW
10.92.020 as an effort to improve law enforcement upon reservations by
increasing a tribal officer’s authority. The statute states,
“nothing . . . impairs or affects the existing status and sovereignty of
those sovereign tribal governments.”280 Therefore, by its own terms, the
statute does not modify a tribal officer’s inherent sovereign authority.
The act only created an avenue through which tribal officers could
enforce state law.281
The legislative intent and stated purpose behind RCW 10.92.020
supports this interpretation. Representative John McCoy, 38th
Legislative District,282 drafted and sponsored the bill that became RCW
10.92.020. According to Representative McCoy, the bill was a reaction
to inefficient and ineffective law enforcement measures within
reservations.283 Due to their limited jurisdiction and resources, tribes
relied on state officers to help enforce the law.284 This often meant tribes
279. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wash. 2d 1, 11–12, 43 P.3d 4, 10 (2002).
280. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(7) (2010).
281. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.070(6); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020(1), (4)–(5).
282. The 38th District consists of parts of Snohomish County, including Everett, Marysville, and
the Tulalip Indian Reservation. Find Your Legislator, WASH. ST. LEGISLATURE,
http://apps.leg.wa.gov/DistrictFinder/Default.aspx?district=38 (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
283. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7.
284. Id.
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were at the mercy of the availability of a local peace officer.285 If a peace
officer could not come to the site of a detention, tribal officers were
forced to release law violators.286 Also, local law enforcement agencies
often assigned only one peace officer to the reservation, further limiting
the resources available.287 The same law enforcement agencies were
unwilling to negotiate interlocal agreements with tribal governments and
refused to extend full faith and credit to tribal officer-initiated
detentions.288 Gaps in criminal jurisdiction289 compounded the lack of
law enforcement as violators could hop between jurisdictions, easily
falling through the gaps.290 RCW 10.92.020 forces local police agencies
to negotiate with tribes and aims to establish more cohesive crime
prevention throughout all levels of government.291 The legislative intent
of the statute was to make it easier for tribal officers to make arrests that
courts would later uphold, and for the state as a whole to maintain law
and order.292
Related statutes also suggest the Washington State Supreme Court
should only interpret RCW 10.92.020 as an extension of a tribal officer’s
authority. Washington statutes that address tribal officers evince a goal
to improve law enforcement while respecting the self-government of
tribes.293 At a basic level, the legislative creation of the status of “tribal
officer”294 is an acknowledgment of the position’s legitimacy within the
state. To receive state recognition as a “tribal officer,” the officer must
undergo the same training as a peace officer,295 ensuring a minimum
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 27, at 1418 (“[Public Law 280 created] jurisdictional
vacuums or gaps . . . . Sometimes these gaps exist because no government has authority. Sometimes
they arise because the government(s) that may have authority in theory has no institutional support
or incentive for the exercise of that authority.”).
290. In particular, instances of Domestic Violence and Drug Trafficking were, and continue to be,
problematic. For example, in mixed relationships (meaning only one spouse was a member of the
tribe) if the non-member was the abuser, there were limited circumstances in which the state law
system would step in, leaving many occurrences unprosecuted. Interview with Rep. John McCoy,
supra note 7.
291. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19.003 (2010).
292. Interview with Rep. John McCoy, supra note 7.
293. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020; WASH.
REV. CODE § 43.101.157 (2010).
294. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010(2).
295. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.157(1); see supra note 134 for an outline of the training
requirements.
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standard of law enforcement upon reservations. Furthermore,
Washington’s assertion of jurisdiction over reservations under Public
Law 280,296 and subsequent efforts at retrocession,297 indicate a
continued intent to combat lawlessness while supporting tribal interests
in self-government. Such goals are accomplished by affording tribal
officers more power, not less.
Because this is an issue of first impression in Washington, it is helpful
to examine how another state has interpreted a similar statute. Under
Nebraska law, a tribal officer can receive certification to arrest for
violations of state law.298 Similar to Washington,299 the certification only
authorizes tribal officers to enforce state laws for violations on
reservation lands.300 The location of the offense was the dispositive issue
in Young v. Neth,301 one of the few cases nationally that interprets the
authority of tribal officers in cross-jurisdictional issues. In Young, the
court invalidated a certified tribal officer’s arrest of a drunk driver who
violated the law off the tribal officer’s reservation.302 The tribal officer
acted outside his authority because: (1) the officer was not in fresh
pursuit following the commission of the charged crime, (2) the crime
occurred off the reservation, and (3) the tribal officer was the arresting
officer who conducted the field sobriety tests.303 However, the Nebraska
State Supreme Court recognized the tribal officer would have been
within his rights if the officer observed the drunk driving on the
reservation, engaged in fresh pursuit, and only detained until proper
authorities arrived.304 The Court stated that this held true even for noncertified tribal officers.305 Citing the Washington case, State v. Schmuck,
the Nebraska court reiterated that the “tribe’s proper response to a crime
committed by a non-Indian on the reservation is for the tribal police to
detain the offender and deliver him or her to the proper authorities.”306

296. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010).
297. ESHB 2233, ch. 48 §§ 1–3, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (codified as WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)).
298. NEB. REV. STAT § 81-1414(2) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT § 84-106 (2008); 79 NEB. ADMIN.
CODE §§ 10-001 to 10-009 (2005).
299. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.010.
300. 79 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 10-008.
301. 637 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 2002).
302. Id. at 889–90.
303. Id. at 886–87, 889.
304. Id. at 889.
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 387, 850 P.2d 1332, 1339 (1993)).
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The Young decision instructs an interpretation that the Nebraska statute
only affects a tribal officer’s ability to arrest for violations of state
law.307
The canons of statutory interpretation mandate that the Washington
State Supreme Court read RCW 10.92.020 only as an extension of the
authority to enforce state law. Persuasive authority from another
jurisdiction supports this interpretation. The legislature did not intend to
limit a tribe’s ability to ensure safety on the reservation through the
detention of non-Indian violators.
C.

The Precedent the Eriksen III Majority Cites For the Necessary
Limits of Territorial Jurisdiction Is Distinguishable

The Court in Eriksen III stated that the boundaries of territorial
jurisdiction “necessarily limit” a tribe’s authority to continue fresh
pursuit off a reservation unless in pursuit of a suspected felon.308 This is
founded in a general principle that officers can only make valid arrests
within their jurisdictions.309 The majority cites three cases to support its
concept of impermeable borders between territorial jurisdictions: State v.
Barker, City of Wenatchee v. Durham,310 and Irwin v. State.311 However,
the Powers Act312 superseded two of the three cases (Wenatchee and
Irwin),313 while Barker did not consider the applicability of the Uniform
Act.314 Both the Powers Act and the Uniform Act allow for fresh pursuit
of drunk drivers.315 Therefore, the Eriksen III majority fails to prove its
contention that territorial boundaries ban an officer’s ability to pursue

307. “[T]he tribal officer’s status as a special deputy state sheriff would authorize the fresh
pursuit and arrest of persons outside the reservation, whether Indian or non-Indian, in accordance
with Nebraska law.” Auth. of Tribal Police Officers Cross-Designated as Special Deputy State
Sheriffs, Neb. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 02009, 2002 WL 470823, at *4 (Mar. 25, 2002).
308. State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 512, 259 P.3d 1079, 1082 (2011).
309. Id. at 509, 259 P.3d at 1081 (citations omitted).
310. 43 Wash. App. 547, 549–50, 718 P.2d 819, 821 (1986), superseded by statute, WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010), as recognized in Vance v. State, 116 Wash. App. 412, 65 P.3d 668
(2003).
311. 10 Wash. App. 369, 371, 517 P.2d 619, 621 (1974), superseded by statute, WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.31.100 (2010), as recognized in State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 25 P.3d 423.
312. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.93.001–.900 (2010).
313. See State v. Barron, 139 Wash. App. 266, 272 n.2, 160 P.3d 1077, 1079 n.2 (2007); State v.
Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 921–22, 25 P.3d 423, 426 (2001).
314. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d at 920 n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 n.1; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 10.89.010–.080
(2010).
315. See supra Parts III.A–.B for discussion on the authorization of pursuit of drunk drivers under
the Powers Act and the Uniform Act.
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drunk drivers across jurisdictional boundaries.
All three cases cited in Eriksen III acknowledge that an exception to
the limits of territorial jurisdiction is an instance of fresh pursuit.316 As
indicated in Wenatchee, common law cross-jurisdictional fresh pursuit
required a felony committed within the pursuing officers’ jurisdiction.317
However, the Powers Act explicitly expanded a Washington officer’s
authority to pursue persons “reasonably believed to have committed a
violation of traffic or criminal law.”318 Admittedly, tribal officers do not
inherently have the power to arrest under Washington law as is required
for authority under the Powers Act. But banning fresh pursuit because
the violation was not a felony is no longer the standard.319
Additionally, the Washington State Legislature has authorized
officers from other states to continue cross-jurisdictional pursuit into the
state.320 The Uniform Act permits officers from a foreign jurisdiction,
whether they receive certification from Washington, to arrest in
Washington as long as it is pursuant to fresh pursuit.321 Also, the
Uniform Act specifically authorizes the pursuit of intoxicated or reckless
drivers.322 Therefore, officers from outside of Washington’s jurisdiction
may come into the state and arrest for violations of another state’s traffic
code.323 The Uniform Act means there is no longer a categorical ban of
fresh pursuit based on certification to enforce Washington law.324
The combined effect of the Powers Act and the Uniform Act is
recognized in the only case the Eriksen III majority explores in depth:
Barker.325 In Barker, the Washington State Supreme Court held that an
out-of-state officer without special certification from Washington State
had no common law or statutory authority to pursue a drunk driver
across state lines based solely upon probable cause for a

316. See Barker, 143 Wash. 2d at 921, 25 P.3d at 425; City of Wenatchee, 43 Wash. App. at 550,
718 P.2d at 821; Irwin, 10 Wash. App. at 370, 517 P.2d at 620.
317. 43 Wash. App. at 550, 718 P.2d at 821–22.
318. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.120(1) (2010).
319. See id. (expanding the authorized instances of fresh pursuit to non-felonies). The legislature
abrogated reliance upon the limits of common law fresh pursuit. Vance v. State, 116 Wash. App.
412, 415–16, 65 P.3d 668, 670 (2003).
320. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.010 (2010).
321. See supra Part III.B for discussion of the Uniform Act and its effect on cross-jurisdictional
fresh pursuit.
322. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.89.010.
323. Id.
324. Id.; State v. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d 915, 920 n.1, 25 P.3d 423, 425 n.1 (2001).
325. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d 506, 509–10, 259 P.3d 1079, 1081 (2011).
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misdemeanor.326 The Court did not analyze this issue under the Uniform
Act because the State did not file an Answer to Barker’s Petition for
Review.327 This meant the Court was not reviewing the trial court’s
determination that the officer lacked the legal authority to arrest in
Washington.328 Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court was only
evaluating the case under the common law standard of fresh pursuit and
within the framework of the Powers Act, which required authorization to
arrest under Washington law.329 In a footnote, the Court made it clear
that the Uniform Act authorized this arrest.330 Because the Uniform Act
negates the precedential value of Barker, the Eriksen III majority’s
reliance on it is misplaced.
The Eriksen III Court’s misuse of these precedents undermines its
decision. The Court fails to support its contention that territorial
boundaries “necessarily” limit jurisdiction. Furthermore, both the
Powers Act and the Uniform Act expressly allow for fresh pursuit of
drunk drivers.331 Thus, the Court should not have dismissed the pursuit
of Loretta Eriksen simply because it was a misdemeanor. The Court’s
failure to prove this point weakens its decision.
D.

The Inability of Tribal Officers to Detain Non-Members Without
Certification Will Endanger General Public Safety

While the legal foundations of Eriksen III are suspect, the decision is
also an affront to public policy and safety. As Justice Owens indicated in
dissent, the majority’s holding illogically restricts a non-certified tribal
officer’s ability to uphold law and order.332 Non-Indians, in particular
drunk drivers, are encouraged to engage in a high-speed chase to reach
the borders of the reservation before tribal officers can impede their
progress. This not only may result in harm to others on the
reservation,333 but a high-speed escapee is still driving drunk on the

326. 143 Wash. 2d at 922, 25 P.3d at 426.
327. Id. at 920 & n.1, 921–22, 25 P.3d at 425 & n.1, 426.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 921–22, 25 P.3d at 425–26; WASH. REV. CODE § 10.93.070 (2010).
330. Barker, 143 Wash. 2d at 920 n.1, 25 P.3d at 425 n.1.
331. See supra Parts III.A–.B for discussion on the authorization of pursuit of drunk drivers under
the Powers Act and the Uniform Act.
332. Eriksen III, 172 Wash. 2d 506, 520–21, 259 P.3d 1079, 1086 (2011) (Owens, J., dissenting).
333. The fact that crashes and traffic-related deaths are already disproportionately high among
Native American populations compounds the negative effects stemming from the encouragement of
high-speed chases on reservations. In a 2009 agreement with the Tribes of Washington State, the
Washington Traffic Safety Commission noted that, in the state, Native Americans die in traffic
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roads of Washington. It is entirely possible that the driver will injure
citizens of the state.334 Therefore, this is an issue of protecting the safety
of all Washingtonians.
The restrictions placed on a non-certified tribal officer are misguided
and inconsistent with other legislative efforts. The State of Washington
emphasizes drunk-driving prevention.335 For instance, in 2004, the
legislature found the rate of drunk driving to be “unacceptable” and
strengthened the laws surrounding blood alcohol tests.336 To “convey the
seriousness with which the legislature views this problem[,]”337 a
driver’s refusal to take a test is admissible as evidence in a criminal trial,
and is sufficient to warrant the State’s revocation of driving privileges
for at least one year.338 Additionally, in 2011, the legislature passed
“Hailey’s Law,” which orders police to impound vehicles of DUI
suspects for twelve hours.339 After Eriksen III, an uncertified tribal
officer cannot even force the drunk driver to walk home.340 Nothing
prevents the driver from continuing down the road or reentering the
reservation and harming other citizens. Such a result runs counter to the

accidents at a rate roughly 3.17 times higher than the combined average of all other racial groups.
Between 1999 and 2007, Native Americans suffered 32.95 traffic fatalities per 100,000 people (the
next highest were Hispanics at 15.31). If the data is restricted to drunk-driver related traffic
fatalities, Native Americans suffer fatal accidents 4.2 times more frequently (17.78 per 100,000)
than the average of other races (Hispanics were again second highest at 6.83). The Safety
Commission acknowledges the numbers could actually be worse because crash data upon
reservations is underreported. Centennial Accord Agreement, State of Washington (Washington
Traffic Safety Commission)-the Tribes of Washington State, Mar. 1, 2009, 1–3, available at
http://www.wtsc.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/03/cen_accord0509.pdf.
A
combination of a high propensity of drunk-driver related fatalities and high-speed pursuits
stemming from evasion of tribal officers cannot equal good results for tribal safety.
334. Sovereign immunity insulates tribes from private tort litigation for serving alcohol to a drunk
driver who subsequently hurts an innocent bystander. Foxworthy v. Puyallup Tribe of Indians
Ass’n, 141 Wash. App. 221, 223, 169 P.3d 53, 54 (2007).
335. See, e.g., Legislature Passes DUI Impound Bill Dubbed ‘Hailey’s Law,’ KOMO NEWS (Apr.
14, 2011, 10:36 a.m.), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/119860664.html; David Ammons,
Gregoire Wants Traffic Sobriety Checkpoints, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2008,
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Gregoire-wants-traffic-sobriety-checkpoints-1260954.php;
Curt Woodward, Gregoire Signs Tougher DUI Law, SEATTLE POST- INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15,
2006, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Gregoire-signs-tougher-DUI-law-1198561.php.
336. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 1; see generally WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2010).
337. 2004 Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 68, § 1.
338. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308(2)(a)–(b).
339. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 46.55.350–.360 (Supp. 2011). “Hailey’s Law” was a direct result of
an incident where a cited drunk driver struck Hailey Huntley head-on. In this instance, the police
officer had forced the drunk driver to walk home, but the driver managed to find her way back to
her car. Legislature Passes DUI Impound Bill, supra note 335.
340. 172 Wash. 2d 506, 514–15, 259 P.3d 1079, 1083 (2011).
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efforts of the legislature to curtail drunk driving and risks exacerbating
the problem by encouraging drivers to engage in flight for the border.
Beyond the insult to tribal sovereignty, this decision places all people of
the state in harm’s way.
VI. CONGRESS SHOULD EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZE A TRIBE’S
AUTHORITY TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS ACROSS
TERRITORIAL BOUNDARIES
Only Congress can define tribal inherent sovereign authority.341
Unfortunately, after Eriksen III, the State did not file a writ of certiorari
with the U.S. Supreme Court. Now other states may follow
Washington’s lead and restrict the authority of tribal officers to enforce
tribal law and safety. To remedy Eriksen III, and to prevent other states
from following suit, Congress should step in to define tribal authority
and prevent states from usurping this traditional federal power.
Congress has expressly defined tribal sovereignty before. In 1990, the
U.S. Supreme Court held in Duro v. Reina that the Salt River PimaMaricopa Indian Community could not prosecute a non-member
Indian.342 Afterward, Congress enacted the “Duro Fix.”343 Congress
amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to redefine a tribe’s “powers of
self-government . . . [as including] the inherent power of Indian tribes,
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all
Indians.”344 Such legislation restructured the entire analysis in tribal
criminal jurisdiction. Congress acted within its “exclusive and plenary”
authority in Indian law to define tribal sovereignty.345
Here, Congress should similarly step in to relax restrictions on tribal
jurisdiction. A parallel addendum to the Indian Civil Rights Act, or even
enacting separate legislation, will expressly define a tribe’s “powers of
self-government.” The legislation would recognize the tribe’s right to
protect its sovereign interest in maintaining law and safety through the
exercise of its right to detain non-Indians. Additionally, Congress should
declare that artificial territorial boundaries do not limit a tribe’s interest
341. See supra Part I.
342. 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006), as recognized
in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
343. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006). See text accompanying supra notes 51–53 for a discussion
of the “Duro Fix” and its role in the development of Indian jurisdiction.
344. 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2). The U.S. Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to define the
restrictions on a tribe’s criminal jurisdiction in Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.
345. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (upholding Congress’s right to relax restrictions on a tribe’s criminal
jurisdiction over nonmember Indians).
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in protecting its political integrity, economic security, and health or
welfare. By couching the authority within the terms of the second
Montana exception,346 Congress would ensure a nexus to on-reservation
interests in self-government and internal relations. Congress’s express
recognition of tribal self-governmental powers could even limit a tribe’s
exercise of extra-jurisdictional detention to instances of fresh pursuit
originating on the reservation and stemming from a non-Indian’s
violation of the tribal legal code. The key is that Congress explicitly
acknowledges a tribe’s interest in exercising its rights is not limited to a
reservation. This proposed legislation will prevent states from
unilaterally defining tribal rights and afford tribal interests proper
protection.
CONCLUSION
The Washington State Supreme Court’s ruling in Eriksen III suffers
from several fundamental flaws. First, the Court incorrectly analyzed a
tribe’s inherent sovereign authority in terms of a state statute. The
legislature’s enactment of RCW 10.92.020 is irrelevant to a court’s
consideration of a tribe’s authority to enforce laws and protect safety. A
state cannot unilaterally define tribal powers. A tribe retains those
powers of sovereignty not expressly removed by statute or treaty, or by
implication of the tribe’s dependent status. Congress has never removed,
nor did the tribal parties to Point Elliott relinquish, the authority to
detain non-Indian law violators. Courts have even held that it is a tribe’s
affirmative duty to detain violators and deliver the individuals to state
officers. Where the officer detains a law violator does not change where
the non-Indian broke the law or the internal tribal interests involved. The
ability to enforce laws is a vital part of self-government that can extend
beyond borders. Second, the Court misinterpreted RCW 10.92.020 as a
limit on tribal authority to enforce laws. The plain meaning of the
statute, and the legislative intent, indicate an effort to increase law
enforcement on reservations by allowing tribal officers authority to
arrest for violations of state law. This interpretation is in line with
related statutes and a similar jurisdiction. Third, the Court also
misapplied the precedent it cited as support for the impermeability of
territorial boundaries. None of the cases the majority cited actually prove
this contention, nor do they directly apply to the situation at hand.
Reliance on them as sole support for the proposition that tribes cannot
346. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564–66 (1981); see text accompanying supra note
61.
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have interests outside their reservation boundaries is misplaced. Finally,
Eriksen III flouts public safety and legislative efforts to prevent drunk
driving, encouraging drivers to engage in a high-speed race for the
reservation border.
Congress should pass legislation to explicitly recognize a tribe’s
sovereign authority to protect internal self-government and public safety
through cross-jurisdictional pursuit of non-Indian law violators. Through
this legislation, Congress would offer an express statement that resolves
without question this jurisdictional gap and statutorily overrules Eriksen
III.

